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After November 1918 Germany was heading towards an uncertain future that
did not solely depend on the German people after the collapse of the authoritar-
ian state, which the Empire most certainly was.* Especially one of the victorious
powers, the United States, conjoined its peace programme with clear ideologi-
cal- political convictions. Just after entering the war the American president,
Woodrow Wilson, established a “Committee on Public Information” ( CPI ) to ex-
plain to the Americans the reasons that their country had taken up arms to de-
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Abstract
Seit  dem En de  des Ers ten Welt krie ges
 ist  das Ver hält nis zwi schen  den Ver ei -
nig ten Staa ten  und Deutsch land  durch
ei nen ein sei ti gen Kul tur-  und Po li tik -
trans fer be stimmt. Zwei mal such ten
 die  USA  den de mo kra ti schen Ver fas -
sungs staat  in Deutsch land  zu im ple -
men tie ren,  das zwei te  Mal er folg reich.
Da bei ver fuh ren  sie  im  Blick  auf  die  in
Eu ro pa ver an ker ten Tra di tio nen  oft re -
la tiv sorg los.  Der ame ri ka ni sche An -
spruch,  die  Welt  zu de mo kra ti sie ren,
 wird im mer wie der kon ter ka riert  durch
 die Ver hält nis se  in  den  USA  selbst  und
 durch  das au ßen po li ti sche Agie ren  der
 USA.  Es  ist  oft die se Glaub wür dig keits -
lü cke,  die  das  an  sich po si ti ve An lie gen
 ins Zwie licht  rückt  und  die ame ri ka ni -
sche „Mis si on“ be hin dert.
fend its freedom and the free institutions.1 The “common principles” of the
French - British - American alliance were to be explained to the people using mass
media. From historical perspective it was Jean - Jacques Rousseau, Oliver Crom -
well and Thomas Jefferson, who played the main roles. This was admittedly war
propaganda, but at the same time it was the attempt to ensure the basis of a par-
liamentarian democracy and a free society. This democracy was internally com-
pleted by the proclamation of a new social order and externally President Wilson
conceptualised the vision of a world society of free, sovereign peoples.2 The
German autocracy with its Kaiser and homogenous concept of nation and peo-
ple was stylised as the opposite of Wilson’s project to defend social democracy
and freedom on a world scale.
But was the German Empire the autocratic regime the Wilson administration
made it out to be ? It is possible, therefore, to speak of a “split constitutional re-
ality”.3 On the one hand, the parliament ( Reichstag ) increased its influence
through its inter - party committee ( Interfraktioneller Ausschuss ) and on the other
hand, the supreme army command claimed the highest power through the em-
peror. However, Wilson’s interpretation of the German constitution left no
room for such details.4 To the American president, who saw himself as defender
of Europe’s freedom, a “re - education of the Germans towards democracy”5 was
essential. The pre - requisite to be able to do this was an internal coup d’état. In
the Allies’ war propaganda Wilhelm II, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had already
been described as war criminals, thus a ceasefire could not be negotiated with
them. Ludendorff was flexible enough to demand a reform of the constitution in
order to improve the terms of negotiations. Although he deeply despised the par-
liamentary - democratic system, he wanted to use it as an instrument. If a demo-
232 Aufsätze / Articles
1 Cf. Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom, New York / London 1999, p. 169. See
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nalen Ge schich te des 20. Jahrhunderts. Festschrift Detlef Junker, Stuttgart 2004,
p. 263–278.
5 Salewski, Erster Weltkrieg ( note 3), p. 319.
cratically legitimised government acknowledged responsibility for the disastrous
outcome of the war, it would thus compromise its own democratic system and
exonerate the authoritarian one of the supreme military command. Thus, as a re-
sult of Ludendorff’s solicitation the constitution was changed, the parliamentary
principle established and Prince Max von Baden was nominated as the Reich
chancellor.6 This first democratic government, in which the majority of parties
were represented by state secretaries without portfolios, sent Wilson a first
diplomatic note on October 3rd 1918. It named Wilson’s Fourteen Points of
January 8th 19187 as the basis for peace negotiations. These Fourteen points in-
cluded the withdrawal from all occupied territories, the establishment of an in-
dependent Polish state, the return of Alsace - Lorraine to France and the sover-
eignty of the peoples, but not a change of regime in Germany. This was about to
change. Wilson wanted the German Empire to collapse. Already in his first reply
on October 8th 1918 he asked Max von Baden whether he was only speaking on
behalf of those powers of the Reich, who had been waging the war until then.8
The von Baden’s answer on October 12th read : “The present German govern-
ment, which carries the responsibility for this step towards peace, has been
formed through negotiations and in accordance with the great majority of the
parliament [ Reichstag ]. In every one of its actions, sustained by the will of the
majority, the Reich chancellor speaks in the name of the German government
and the German people.”9 Thus, Max von Baden had eliminated the supreme
military command and the emperor from the constitutional range, i.e. they were
no longer constitutional organs. As if this clarification had not happened, Wilson
stated in his second note on October 14th that for the governments associated
against Germany, it was indispensable to unequivocally know with whom they
were negotiating.10 In his third note on October 23rd Wilson once again stressed
that they were not willing to negotiate with the representatives of the old system.
Bruno Doehring, the emperor’s last court preacher, perceived a “satanic idea”
in Wilson’s demand for the abdication of Wilhelm II. Doehring confessed : “The
monarchy in Prussia is a thousand times more than a political question for us
Protestants : For us, it is a question of faith.”11 Since the demand for a regime
change came externally and the young parliamentarian democracy was bound to
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execute it, democracy fell into discredit. German honour seemed tarnished. The
harsh conditions of the ceasefire and the Treaty of Versailles contributed to com-
promise the parliamentary - democratic system in the population’s eyes. Wilson’s
noble democratic aims, such as the sovereignty of the nations, obviously did not
apply to the German - speaking countries. So, for example, the Entente powers
disregarded the provisional national assembly’s decision from Vienna on
November 12th 1918 to integrate German Austria into the Empire. Additionally
it was not the old autocratic powers but the social democrats, who were in
favour of a greater German national state.12
It was not only the deep chasm between Wilson’s Fourteen Points on the one
hand and a rearrangement of Europe on the other hand, which compromised
the American nation’s democratic ideals of freedom and peace. It was also the
living conditions within the United States, which had hardly kept up with the
standards proclaimed in Europe. In truth the ideological debate with the Central
European powers encouraged Wilson to take pains for a similar democratisation
in his own country. In 1916 he cautiously greeted the women’s rights movement.
At that time in only twelve of the 48 states did women have the right to vote.13
Also African Americans, who did not have the right to vote and were forced to
live in segregation from the white population, pinned their hopes on their presi-
dent’s freedom programme. Most black leaders saw the United States’ engage-
ment in the First World War as a chance to realise the freedom, which had been
promised for everybody including African Americans. As a result of the war im-
migration from Europe was stagnating, thus thousands of African Americans
streamed from the South to the North, in order to find employment in the indus-
try and flee the repression in the Southern states. During the last year of the war
an orgy of violence erupted in the country. Alone in May 1918 the state of
Georgia recorded 11 lynch murders. 
Wilson’s principle of sovereignty was intended to be valid all over the world,
but only for whites. Imperialism was still the ruling force in Asia and Africa,
while the USA’s democratic allies, France and Great Britain, were sharing the
German and Turkish colonies among themselves. 
At the beginning of 1918, the publisher Walter Lippmann (1889–1974) de-
clared that the battle for democracy could not be over after the defeat of
Prussian autocracy. America must also rivet on its own tyrannies as well on the
coal mines of Colorado, the autocratic steel industry, clothing shops and the
slums.14 During the 1919/20 great steel workers’ strike 365,000 workers took
part in the walkout and thus America was caught up by its own freedom procla-
mations. Yet, it was not progress that triumphed, instead a restrictive conglomer-
ate of laws, which were passed during the war, lead to one of the most conserva-
tive decades in American history. Several thousand American citizens were
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sentenced to long term imprisonment because they had spoken out against the
war. Social unrest was also violently suppressed. “Almost dictatorial measures”15
were taken in order to reconvert the American economy to a war industry. 
Wilson’s claim to democratise the whole world and to install an international
peace order16 was contradicted by the circumstances existing in his own country.
Nevertheless, this claim was tantamount to the will of the US administration to
be acknowledged as the leading ideological world power. When considering the
period, in which Wilson proclaimed his Fourteen Points that were basically a
guideline for world peace, then it becomes obvious that the United States hereby
once more underlined her claim for leadership. The Fourteen Points from
January 8th 1918 were the answer to the peace negotiations of Brest - Litovsk,
which had begun on December 22nd 1917 and which Wilson essentially nullified
in his speech. In further speeches, the last one given on September 27th 1918,17
Wilson affirmed his principles, which also clearly opposed Soviet Russia’s ideo-
logical basis.18 The American - Soviet antagonism began at that point, not in
1945. 
If all German hopes were initially pinned on Wilson and the United States be-
cause they could hardly expect a just peace from Great Britain and France, then
after the peace treaty they regarded him as responsible for their desperate situa-
tion.19 Wilson had given in to the Allies and had not defended for his own princi-
ples. 
Wilson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919, but the US Senate refused to
ratify the Treaty of Versailles and as such rejected membership of the League of
Nations. The convention of the Democratic Party nominated James Middleton
Cox (1870–1957) instead of Wilson. However, America elected the Republican
party’s candidate, Warren G. Harding (1865–1923), as president and withdrew
from the Old World, once more to Germany’s disappointment.20
Previously the Western Allies, lead by the USA, had more or less coercively
democratised vast parts of Europe, including Germany.21 The German people
had not chosen the republican constitution as the result of their own develop-
ment. Instead, the Weimar Republic had come into existence as a consequence
of the military defeat of the Empire. On August 24th /25th 1921 the USA conclud-
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ed separate peace treaties with the German Empire and Austria, which made
American - German relations appear better than those of Germany and the two
other Western democracies, Great Britain and France. The quick start to good
economic relations between the USA and Germany ( “economic peace” ) admit-
tedly implied that a system of government, which was convenient for the USA22,
was established in Germany. Furthermore, Germany was to be integrated in a
new international economic and political order, which was primarily determined
by the United States. Throughout the nineteen - twenties the American Govern -
ment sought a peaceful exchange with Germany on an economic basis. Due to
the interaction of government and business people the political and economic
factors seemed so entangled with each other that both factors complemented
each other. When France occasionally opposed this policy, the American
Govern ment in 1926 and in 1931 seriously considered forming a German -
British - American block.23 At the beginning of September 1930 the French for-
eign minister, Aristide Briand (1862–1932), supported by the German foreign
minister Gustav Stresemann24, submitted a plan for the “United States of
Europe” i. e. a European customs and economy union, to the assembly of the
League of Nations. This plan never progressed. 
On the German part there was also a lively interest in the United States,
which due to its prosperity and its lifestyle had an almost magical appeal for
many Germans. The life and work of car manufacturer Henry Ford, who starting
from nothing had reached incredible heights, was the personification of the
American dream for many people. However, Ford’s anti - Semitism did not re-
main unnoticed and greatly impressed Baldur von Schirach, as the latter stated
on record during the Nuremberg trials.25
Thus, in the nineteen - twenties a new rapprochement between the USA and
Germany took place. It took shape in form of international agreements and
treaties, especially the Arbitral and Settlement Treaty of 1928, but also the re-
newing contacts in non - governmental areas.26 However, this hopeful develop-
ment was disturbed by the German Empire’s military revisionist intentions, espe-
cially during the Disarmament Conference of 1932. It became clear that a
political and economic reinforcement not only mattered a great deal to
Germany, but that the country also strived for a military power position. It was
part of the maxims of American policy that the states should be willing to safe-
guard their interests on the basis of international law, by making use of diploma-
cy and international treaties, not by military means. “The old Prussian spirit is
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coming up,” was the comment of the American Secretary of State for foreign af-
fairs, Henry Lewis Stimson, on the deconstruction of the Parliament of the
Weimar Republic. He went on to say, “And now we have a new very dangerous
sore spot in the world.”27 President Hoover tried in vain to induce the Reich
Government to relinquish plans to build the Armoured Cruiser B. Hoover said
that the American Government found it difficult to explain to the tax payers why
the USA remitted Germany’s debts, while Germany was building battleships.28
On the cultural level the Nazi’s protests against the anti - war movie “All Quiet on
the Western Front” had already proven disastrous. The film, produced in the
USA in 1930, was based on Erich Maria Remarque’s novel of the same name
about the First World War and was welcomed as the manifesto of a democratic
mentality. The advertising, mentioning its ban in the Soviet Union, claimed that
“the democratic world [...] [ perceives ] a new, sublime sense in this book and
movie”.29 After the film was also prohibited in Germany in mid - December 1930,
since it was considered to taint the reputation of the Reichswehr, the American
public reacted with indignation. 
Some highlights of the German - American interwar relations were the ex-
change of scholars, the record - setting navigation of the high - speed steamers
Bremen and Europa, the reception of the crew of the Junkers plane Bremen and
the journeys of the German airships Graf Zeppelin and Do X. Despite some irri-
tation every now and then, Stresemann’s foreign policy strategy of being bound
to the West and his appeasement policy produced a continuous improvement of
American - German relations. Tensions only arose when, during Heinrich Brü -
ning’s chancellorship, a policy of virtual confrontation was adopted. Not least
because of the American credits in the area of 8 billion Marks did the Americans
admittedly maintain a constant interest in the political developments in
Germany. Their wishes centred on an “orderly constitutional state [...]”.30 Due
to German - Russian military collaboration31 it is often forgotten that the United
States were the first nation ready to start a formal exchange programme with the
German Reich.32 Regardless of scepticism the USA therefore continued their
“policy of a peaceful change” towards Germany.33 Only since Brüning’s fall and
his substitution by Franz von Papen in June 1932 did a clear deterioration of the
German - American relations occur.34 The political radicalisation and the empha-
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32 Cf. Wala, Weimar, loc.cit. ( note 26), p. 286.
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34 Winkler wrote on the final cause for the collapse of the first German democracy : “If
the collapse of the first German Republic can be traced back to a single root cause, it
sis of the military power in German politics caused growing concerns for the
American diplomats.35 Nevertheless, the American public mistakenly assumed
that the Germans, like themselves, had a clear aversion of Fascism and
Communism and thus played down the developments in Germany.36 However,
Hitler was often depicted in the American press as a mediocre and ridiculous
personality, who was not to be taken seriously. Goebbels was given the belittling
nickname “Wotan’s Mickey Mouse”.37
The reversal in public opinion, which finally led to a unanimous rejection of
the Third Reich, occurred very slowly.38 This was not only due blunt misjudge-
ments of the regime’s true aims, but also the Americans’ imperturbable belief in
the superiority of liberal - democratic state and social orders.39 However, in
American business circles and against the backdrop of a decreasing economic
trend and unemployment in the USA, the development of the new, National
Socialist model of society and economy was observed with great curiosity. 
The anti - Jewish excesses certainly caused a number of protest demonstra-
tions. The most important demonstration took place on March 27th 1933 in
Madison Square Garden. Between 55,000 and 60,000 people took part in this
event, which was organised by the “American Jewish Committee”, the “Ame -
rican Jewish Congress” and “B’nai B’rith”. Admittedly, these protests had no
great effect, just as the various calls to boycott German products were unsuccess-
ful. This was to a certain extent the result of an anti - Semitic bias in the United
States.40 The climax of parliamentary protest was reached by the resolution of
New York representative, William I. Sirowich, according to which all contracts
with Germany should be annulled. The Congress did not pass this motion. On
the other hand, the growing number of reports of riots in Germany managed to
cause a continual decline in support for the Germans. In the long run all at-
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tempts of placation could not hide that the desperate reports from Germany on
the treatment of regime opponents and Jews were true. 
Against the backdrop of the events in Germany, it may not be forgotten that
the United States found itself in a desperate situation in the spring of 1933. At
the end of 1932 the unemployment figure had risen to 13 million, which was
more than a quarter of the potential working population.41 President Hoover de-
clared helplessly : “Some kind of monstrous power has seized the system, it is
temporarily out of order.”42 When the new president, Franklin Delano Roose -
velt, was sworn into office on March 4th 1933, the crisis had reached its peak.
Roosevelt, who always showed optimism, understood the psychological dimen-
sion of this economic depression. In a special session of Congress he stated : “We
put our trust in the future of democracy. The people of the United States have
not failed. In their trouble, they ask for direct, vigorous action. They ask for dis-
cipline and leadership.”43 Roosevelt created the “New Deal”, an experiment -
rich and sometimes confused programme of action, which nevertheless caused
great optimism. These beginnings had, among other things, the consequence
that ethnic, racial and religious minorities increasingly rose to the esteemed
ranks of American society. Also according this point of view, the New Deal was
a victory of modern America over its own past. Politics, humanity, sense of jus-
tice, economic and social reforms merged to form a unity of action in the New
Deal. After a transitory recovery of economy, the number of unemployed once
again rose to 10 million in 1938. Only as a consequence of the outbreak of the
war did the unemployment rate slowly sink, until in 1942 full employment was
achieved.44 The conservative Republicans were concerned about America’s free-
dom and accused Roosevelt of following a socialist course.45 In 1934 Herbert
Hoover published a work with the meaningful title The Challenge to Liberty.
While contemporary witnesses feared the slide into socialism, historians nowa-
days rather see certain parallels in the limitations of liberty to the emergency
measures taken by the fascist regimes in Europe.46
During this time, some influential political circles in the USA turned away
from the outer world because they were of the erroneous conviction that these
problems had been introduced from outside and it was possible to shut them
out. This egocentric form of nationalism, called “isolationism”, was to remain
only an episode that finally lead to a system of collective security. However, they
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initially wanted to a neutrality legislation in the mid - nineteen - thirties in order to
avoid America once more becoming involved in a world conflict. In the case of
war, the American president had to place an embargo on munitions - deliveries to
the war - waging countries and to declare that the travel and goods transport of
American citizens under the flag of war - waging countries would receive no
American protection. Roosevelt dismissed all such isolationist ideas on April
14th 1939.47 He asked for Hitler’s and Mussolini’s assurance that they would not
attack 31 expressly named countries48 and as such contradicted the officially
neutrality course by repeatedly signalling his support of his partners on the “Old
World”.49
In order to understand the further development and its stunning parallels
with the constellations at the end of First World War one must take into account
that Roosevelt was an old Wilsonian. “Wilson’s vision remained Roosevelt’s
model of action until the end of his life.”50 Roosevelt also pursued a concept of
collective security guarantees. In his famous “Quarantine Speech” of October
5th 193751 he pronounced himself, admittedly still in cautious terms, to be in
favour of a collective containment of the totalitarian aggression in Europe and
Asia. Although the number of sympathisers with right or left wing extremism
was relatively small in the USA, anti - democratic forces also caused some turbu-
lences in America. The House Committee on Un - American Activities, which was
constituted in 1938, dedicated itself less to fascist activities and more to the al-
leged Communist infiltration of the American government administration.
Conservative circles wanted to expose the “New Deal” as a “red” plan to destroy
the American society. Bound by the majority vote of the neutralists and the mood
in the United States, the American declaration of neutrality took place on
September 5th 1939.52 After all, Roosevelt succeeded with the annulment of the
embargo for munitions, so that the later Allied countries could receive  supplies. 
In order to secure his re - election in summer 1940 Roosevelt was urged to as-
sure that on no account would he lead the country into a war. Since Great
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Britain had no dollar reserves left at the end of December 1940 and bonds for
war - waging countries were prohibited by the neutrality law Roosevelt took up a
“Lend - Lease” program in order to continue to provide the Allies with arms.53 In
January 1941 Roosevelt announced his famous “Four Freedoms” as rough guide-
lines of a future world peace order : Freedom of Speech, Freedom to Worship,
Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear. Popular artist, Norman Rockwell,
illustrated them. These freedoms, which were supplemented by further princi-
ples namely the refusal of territorial aggrandisements, sovereign rights, self - gov-
ernment of the peoples, freedom of movement on sea and non - violence, were in-
cluded in the so - called Atlantic Charta of August 14th 1941. This was a common
declaration, which Roosevelt handed to the press at his first meeting with British
Prime Minister Churchill. This moral appeal had a similar function to Wilson’s
Fourteen Points and culminated in the declaration that they strove for “the final
destruction of the Nazi tyranny”.54 Support for the Soviet Union after the
German attack in June 1941 was more difficult to gain than for Great Britain be-
cause the Hitler - Stalin pact and the anticommunist activities in the USA were
still fresh in the memory of the American population. Only Japan’s attack against
Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1942 and the war declaration of the Axis powers
Germany55 and Italy four days later relieved Roosevelt from the isolationist limi-
tation and led to reconsideration in vast circles of the USA. From then on there
were no loyalty problems regarding the Roosevelt government, although the tol-
erance clearly decreased during the war. For example, alongside the 120,000
Americans of Japanese and Italian descent there were also approximately 24,000
German Americans and pacifists, who were considered politically untrustwor-
thy, were interned on the basis of the “Alien Enemy Act” of 1798.56
At the end of January 1942 the Allies agreed on an affirmation of the princi-
ples of the Atlantic Charter by signing the United Nations Declaration.57
At the Moscow conference for foreign ministers in the second half of October
1943 a European advisory commission was constituted for the elaboration of a
common post - war policy and the establishment of an international organisation
to preserve peace was agreed upon. Although, this war on the part of the Anglo-
Americans had been led as a “democratic crusade against the powers of dark-
ness”,58 the United States did not want to repeat the mistakes of First World War
and wanted to take active part in the shaping of an international order and its
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economic - social basis. To this purpose, already at the end of July 1944 the foun-
dation of an international Monetary Fund and of an international bank for re-
building and development were agreed. In late summer 1944 the USA, Great
Britain and the Soviet Union, at a conference in Dumbarton Oakes at
Washington, D.C. agreed on the plan of a Charter for the United Nations. In the
following year the Statute of the United Nations was written in San Francisco. 
Two times, Germany had unleashed war in order to gratify her world power
delusions. What should happen now ? Roosevelt as his successor, Harry S.
Truman, insisted in principle on the continuity of American foreign politics,59
which can be traced from the Wilson doctrine to the Atlantic Charta. In connec-
tion with the claim of international moral leadership, freedom in democracy and
prosperity should be taught to the whole world. This “American Spirit of
Liberty” was in essence also valid for Germany. Admittedly, the conditions were
the denazification, demilitarisation, decentralisation, secession of territories and
war - criminal processes as the first learning steps. The greater the divide between
east and west, the more tolerantly the Americans behaved. The “Cold War”, inci-
dentally a term brought in circulation in 1947 by Walter Lippmann (1889–
1974),60 forced the integration of West Germany into the American post - war or-
der of the western world.61 This finally openly erupted into an east - west - conflict,
which after the two world wars formed the third great ideological - political con-
frontation of the twentieth century. 
After the conference of Casablanca in mid - February 1943 President Roose -
velt formulated a sentence in relation to his politics of democratisation,62 which
until today is one of the American basic convictions : Every nation which can
freely choose its own form of government, would refuse a German or Japanese
dictatorship.63 We have long since learned that this doctrine is not true. How -
ever, the Americans of the mid - nineteen - forties did not yet believe that liberation
and punishment of the perpetrators sufficed in order to clear the way for the
 establishment of a liberal democracy. Rather, they believed further steps, such as
the psychological treatment of the German “national character” and re - educa-
tion programs, to be absolutely necessary. Their aim consisted of a “liberation of
the public area”, a change of society structures towards pluralism and civiliza-
tion. The idea of a Civil Society formed the actual core of this democratic mes-
sianism. The USA also often disregarded cultural traditions in an imperialist
manner. Again and again tensions accrued between the occupying power and
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the Germans, but also within the German population, which resulted from the
careless contact with the native culture and the easygoing import of American
cultural assets to Germany.64 America understood and still understands its pop-
ular culture, at that time jazz, cinema, technology and consumer goods, as a
source of its international power.65 On the other hand, the USA did not succeed
with some important social reforms. So, for example, they failed with the at-
tempt to abolish the German civil service and to replace it by an Anglo - American
variation.66 According to the Americans even the first of all freedoms, religious
freedom, could not be entirely established in Germany, a crucial deficit, which
they have criticised until today.67 For it was America’s religious dynamics, which
filled this people with revolutionary strength. This is what Max Weber meant
when he wrote to Adolf von Harnack in 1906 : “[...] when judging from a reli-
gious point of view [...] the American’s average sect member [...] stands high
above our mainstream ‘Christian’.”68
However, with their democratisation politics the Americans once again en-
countered their cardinal problem : the problem of credibility. Admittedly, this did
not break out in West Germany, which was soon the “model pupil”69 of
American democratisation politics, as an immediate consequence of the Second
World War. However, it socially arrived with the Vietnam war and finally turned
into an official government contradiction and rejection of American leadership
before the second Gulf War. The justification to intervene with the inner struc-
ture of foreign societies, to perform cultural implantations and to advance the
process of pluralisation of course wins only full persuasion from one’s own in-
tegrity. This integrity has often been missing. The arduous process of having to
explain to a young GI from the Southern states stationed in Germany that
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German racism was a basic evil of the Führer’s dictatorship,70 was of course on-
ly a reflex of the inner - American circumstances. The first question in the focus of
discussion during the New Deal was economic security, not the civil and political
rights of the African Americans. Only at the end of the nineteen - thirties and the
beginning of the forties did civil rights become the centre of attention. However,
at this time the left - liberal influence had already weakened and a conservative
coalition of Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans ruled the
Congress.71 Two of Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms raised their suspicions. They ar-
gued that “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” were not “American
freedoms”, for they only encouraged individuals to make themselves dependent
on the government.72 Instead, they demanded “Freedom of Private Enterprise”,
that is freedom for entrepreneurship and spirit of enterprise.73 America itself
was therefore in no way unanimous about the freedoms, with which it wanted to
favour non - democratic Europe and finally the whole world ! However, the harsh-
est contradiction to their own ideals lay in the race question. In contrast to
Wilson, who had propagated Anglo - Saxon culture as a national norm, Roosevelt
promoted the pluralistic acceptance of a cultural variety, but he could not re-
move the racial bias, which stood as antithesis to the democratic ideals and that,
although Nazi - Germany had been able to refer to the American practice of seg-
regation in order to affirm its own race theories. There were admittedly some
equality measures during the Second World War74, but particularly in the South
of the United States racial discrimination continued. The USA reported 13 lynch
murders of Blacks in 1940/41 alone.75 In a town in Mississippi, which is ironical-
ly called “Liberty”, a Black pastor was murdered in 1944 simply because he had
refused to sell his land, where there was supposed to be oil, to a white man.
African Americans, who migrated to the North or West met with hate and aver-
sion there. In June 1943 Detroit experienced racial unrests, which cost the lives
of 34 people, and 20,000 white workers of an aero engine factory went on strike
because the wages of their black colleagues had been raised.76
It is part of the ironies of the era that the fight or demarcation especially
against the totalitarian dictatorships of Europe led to an inner democratisation
of the United States. The USA had to bring their own house in order under the
pressure of their foreign policy claim of hegemony. For example a judgment
from the Supreme Court of Justice of 1943, which ruled that Jehovah’s
Witnesses had the right to refuse to salute the flag in public schools, was part of
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this process.77 Under “Cold War” conditions this process continued. In the ideo-
logical confrontation with the Soviet Union the Americans were constantly
forced to increase their own moral credibility. By upholding the ideals of a uni-
versally understood free society, despite their own weaknesses, the USA also do-
mestically nurtured a resistance - potential, which constantly evoked new social
eruptions. Both world wars had an emancipation effect for women and minori-
ties. The newspaper The Crisis wrote “A racially segregated army cannot fight for
a free world.”78 In tough and even violent confrontations during the nineteen -
fifties and sixties the African Americans supported by left - liberal forces and the
Supreme Court79, struggled for their socio - political equality. They are rightfully
proud of this act of self - liberation. 
“From the German point of view, no other country of the world has deter-
mined the fate of the Germans in the twentieth Century as much as the United
States of America. [...] the step - by - step transformation of West German values,
mentality, society and culture cannot be explained without considerable
American influence”,80 writes Detlef Junker, an historian of America. The limits
of this shaping influence lie in the understanding of freedom. America’s opti-
mistic dynamics, the aversion against a strong state and administrative over - reg-
ulation, the permissive scepticism, the joy of risk and the optimistic self - confi-
dence of being able to remove problems out of one’s own strength – these
attitudes have remained highly alien to the Germans. For promises of security
they have willingly accepted all possible limitations of their freedom and have
been obedient to authority until today. Great German intellectuals, from Max
Weber81 to Karl R. Popper82 and Ralf Dahrendorf83, have suffered exactly under
that. And exactly the opposite, namely that “picture of freedom”, has always fas-
cinated them about America, despite all reservations. But that is another story.
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